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FEDERAL LEGISLATION STILL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN
THE FIGHT FOR STUDENT-ATHLETE COMPENSATION
Brandon Beyer*
INTRODUCTION
The signing ceremony of California Senate Bill No. 206 (“SB 206”) was not your
typical administrative event. On the set of HBO’s The Shop, Governor Gavin Newsom
was seated alongside professional basketball superstars Lebron James and Diana
Taurasi as he placed his signature at the bottom of the legislation on September 30,
2019. 1 The unique scene of the statute’s enactment was a testament to the high hopes
of its broader implications, the potential effects of which stretched far beyond the
borders of the state where it was now signed into law.
SB 206, better known as the Fair Pay to Play Act, represents the most prominent
attack against the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) prohibition
against compensation for college athletes. 2 The legislation prohibits all California
four-year colleges and universities from denying their student-athletes the opportunity
to earn compensation for their identities.3 The law directly contradicts the NCAA’s
long-standing rules, setting the stage for an inevitable legal battle to determine the state
law’s legitimacy.
However, proponents of the Fair Pay to Play Act are hoping that its passage
represents something much greater than a single state’s effort to compensate college
athletes. The law is a testament to growing national public sentiment calling for
student-athletes’ ability to receive compensation for the use of their identity. SB 206
has inspired lawmakers in several states to draft and introduce their own versions of
the Fair Pay to Play Act. The collective actions of these various state legislators have
illustrated an appetite for student-athlete compensation that spans throughout the
nation. Nonetheless, even at the very early stages of these efforts, the disparate
treatment among states over how college athletes should be compensated foreshadows
roadblocks to the potential widespread implementation of laws similar to the new
California legislation. If such laws are enacted, the practical result would be divergent
systems of athlete compensation among the states.

* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; University of North Dakota, 2017. I would like to
thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for giving me the opportunity to publish this Note, as well as
their invaluable assistance and editing throughout the process. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor
Ed Edmonds for his willingness to serve as my advisor for this Note.
1
See The Shop: Uninterrupted, Gavin Newsom signs California's 'Fair Pay to Play Act' with LeBron
James & Mav Carter, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bfBgjxVgTw.
2
See CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN., § 67456 (West 2019).
3
See id. at § 67456(a)(1).
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As a national organization, the NCAA operates on a broader level than sovereign
states, and its challenge to state laws—such as SB 206—can hinge upon its ability to
operate interstate. In order to achieve the goals behind this wide-spread initiative, the
interstate nature of collegiate athletics demands a federal solution for the ability of
players to be compensated for use of their identity.
It is clear that California’s initial push has succeeded in building national
momentum against the NCAA’s ban on college athletes being paid for use of their
name, image, and likeness. On October 29, 2019, the initiative for change received
the news that it had longed for: the NCAA’s top governing board voted unanimously
to begin the process to permit students participating in collegiate athletics the
opportunity to benefit from the use of their name, image, and likeness.4 While the
announcement was cause for celebration, cautious optimism quickly swept over those
who had long advocated for such a change. This skepticism is rooted in the fact that
the NCAA fought long and hard before conceding to the swelling calls of the public
and legislators across the country. With the amendments to these policies left in the
hands of the NCAA, the organization retains control of the implementation of player
compensation in collegiate sports.
If the objectives of the name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) compensation effort are
entrusted to the very organization that had long opposed its calls for change, it is clear
that the NCAA requires a check to such unilateral control of these policies. This Note
will argue that Congress should introduce legislation as a strategic safety measure to
ensure the goals of this successful movement will be sufficiently achieved. Congress
should utilize the statutes currently being drafted, introduced, and enacted at the state
level as models to develop an interstate solution to an issue that requires national
treatment. By introducing a federal legislative proposal, Congress can ensure that the
NCAA employs policies that would safeguard the intentions of the public advocates,
student-athletes, and state legislators who led the NCAA to concede its opposition and
prevent the NCAA from eluding the goals behind the resounding calls for change.
Part I of this Note will give a brief overview of the history behind the NCAA’s
policies regarding player compensation—both direct and indirect—and the legal issues
related to amateurism in collegiate sports. Part II will then address the public
movement against the NCAA’s amateurism policies, the subsequent state and federal
legislative proposals on the issue, the NCAA’s response to these various proposals,
and the current state of the situation. Part III will analyze the statutory language of the
various legislative proposals—specifically comparing SB 206 to other state proposals,
the issue of collective bargaining, and the need for precautionary federal legislation to
assure that the NCAA properly implements its announced policy in accordance with
public demand.

4
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image and
likeness opportunities, NCAA (October 29, 2019 1:08 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities.
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I. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE NCAA’S PROHIBITION ON PLAYER COMPENSATION
A.

BACKGROUND

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is a voluntary association
of over 1,117 universities.5 Nearly half a million college athletes participate in sixteen
sports across three separate divisions (Division I, II, and III).6 The organization was
initially formed in late-1905 to centralize the safety protocols of college sports.7 In
that year alone, eighteen student-athletes were killed and 149 were seriously injured
playing football, prompting a public outcry to either reform the sport or discontinue it
altogether.8 At the direction of President Theodore Roosevelt, collegiate athletics
leaders formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(“IAAUS”), which later adopted today’s moniker, the NCAA.9
While at first it merely served as a discussion group and rule-making body for
individual sports, the NCAA quickly expanded its role in collegiate athletics. The
NCAA began hosting national championships for sports in 1921 and began
administering women’s athletic programs in 1980.10 Through these developments, the
“voluntary” membership of its participating universities has arguably become
compulsory in order for a school to retain its relevance and ability to participate in
conferences, tournaments, and bowl games.11
Undoubtedly, the NCAA’s most controversial evolution occurred in 1952 when it
established enforcement mechanisms for its member institutions.12 The NCAA’s
enforcement mechanisms allowed for the important preservation of classifying college
athletes as amateurs.13 Over time, the NCAA has developed the definition of
5
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, What is the NCAA?, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
6
Each of the three divisions has its own rules. The institutions are divided into the divisions based upon
the size of their athletic budgets and competitiveness. See Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The
NCAA’s Unlawful Restraint on the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (1993). Division I and
Division II schools can offer scholarships and financial aid based upon athletic ability. However, Division III
schools, the least competitive among the three, have mutually elected to not grant such assistance. See NCAA,
2019-20 NCAA DIVISION III, MANUAL Art. 15.01.3 (2019).
7
See History, ABOUT THE NCAA (Nov. 8, 2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about%2Bt
he%2Bncaa/who%2Bwe%2Bare/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa%2Bhistory.
8
WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE
ATHLETES 38 (1995).
9
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 1995 THE NCAA 7 (1955).
10
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4.
11
See Charles Barrowman III, Can Congress Play Ball?: Congressional Power to Implement and
Enforce Pay-for-Play among Student-Athletes, 18 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 111 (2015). The NCAA
assists its member universities in providing collegiate athletes with various expenses—including housing,
travel, tutoring, graduate test fees, and more—through the Student Assistance Fund. In 2013, the NCAA
distributed more than $73.5 million to its conferences’ member institutions. See id. The NCAA’s conference
and national championships further cemented its monopoly power over collegiate athletics. By rewarding the
academic institutions participating in these championships, the NCAA further incentivized institutions to join
its conference and divisional structure.
12
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 9, at 13.
13
See Jeff K. Brown, Compensation for the Student-Athlete: Preservation of Amateurism, 5 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 147, 148 (1995).
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“amateur” as a series of prohibited actions for college athletes.14 By maintaining
amateur status, students participating in college sports are precluded from receiving
funds, awards, or benefits that are not permissible under NCAA policies, including
direct compensation for participation or financial aid above the university’s cost of
attendance.15
B.

LEGAL ISSUES

The NCAA’s preservation of amateurism has not gone legally uncontested. Its
case law is guided mostly by dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.16
In that case, the Court emphasized the importance of college sports being classified as
amateur in order to distinguish its character and academic tradition from comparable
professional sports.17 Lower courts have followed this guidance, giving the NCAA
“ample latitude” to maintain the amateur classification.18 The NCAA quickly
responded to this judicial interpretation by replacing the use of words such as “players”
and “athletes” with the term “student-athletes.”19 The NCAA’s emphasis on
competitors being students buttressed their amateur status and further rejected the
notion that they could receive any type of employment-like compensation.
In response to further legal challenges, the NCAA continued to reinforce the
concept of student-athletes as amateurs. In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident
14

See NCAA, 2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I, MANUAL Art. 12.1.2 (2019).
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (Revised: 4/25/02 effective 8/1/02, 4/23/03
effective 8/1/03,
4/29/10 effective 8/1/10)
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any
form in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received,
except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses
or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization
based on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and
regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.12, even
if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in
Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1;
(f) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional
draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); or
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.

15

See Brown, supra note 13, at 149.
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
17
Id. at 102.
18
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Banks v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
19
See BYERS, supra note 8, at 69-76, 371-72; see also MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE
CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 445-46 (1998).
16
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Commission, the California Court of Appeals held that a college athlete could have a
contract of employment where a scholarship served as compensation for athletic
services.20 The NCAA again responded, encouraging its member institutions to use
language in their athletic grant-in-aid forms that emphasized principles of amateurism
and the student status of participating athletes.21
The NCAA’s development of notions of amateurism and student-athlete status
largely revolved around the prohibition of players receiving employment
compensation and benefits directly from its member universities. However, for much
of the organization’s history, legal precedent had left the NCAA’s prohibition on
player’s receiving compensation for the use of their name, image, or likeness
untouched. Not only did this additional preclusion bar college athletes from a share of
revenue generated by the NCAA or colleges utilizing student-athletes’ identities, it
also prevented players from acquiring endorsements and advertising deals from third
parties.
In 2009, this restriction finally met legal scrutiny in O’Bannon v. NCAA, a case in
federal court. The plaintiffs, comprised of current and former college student-athletes,
claimed that the NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by preventing players from
receiving a portion of the revenue the Association and its member schools earn from
“the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’ names, images, and likeness in video
games, live game telecasts, and other footage.”22
The Northern District of California found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that
the NCAA’s compensation rules were an unlawful restraint on trade and enjoined the
association from prohibiting its member schools from awarding up to $5,000 per year
in deferred compensation.23 O’Bannon was the first federal court decision to strike
down any aspect of the NCAA’s amateurism rules in violation of antitrust laws, and
certainly the first to mandate by injunction that the Association change its practices.24
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of the district court decision. While
affirming that the NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny—
to be analyzed under the “rule of reason”—it rejected the lower court’s finding that
allowing students to be paid compensation for their NILs is virtually as effective as the
NCAA’s current amateur-status rule.25 The court reasoned that the NCAA’s
preservation of amateurism was of the utmost importance, and that the ability for

20

See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: the
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (2006).
22
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
23
See id. at 1008.
24
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
25
The rule of reason test is the presumptive standard for a Sherman Act claim alleging restraint on trade.
Under this standard, a defendant’s restraint on competition violates the test if the practice’s harm to
competition outweighs its procompetitive effects. Courts typically analyze this balancing standard under a
burden-shifting framework, requiring the plaintiff to show the restraint produces significant anticompetitive
effects within a relevant market before turning to the defendant to produce evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive effects. If it reaches this point, the court will only find against the restraint if the plaintiff
shows that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. See O’Bannon,
7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
21
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students to collect cash compensation was in direct contradiction with maintaining this
status.26
The Ninth Circuit refused to address whether participants in live TV broadcasts of
sporting events have enforceable rights of publicity or whether players are injured by
the NCAA’s current licensing arrangement for archival footage.27 Instead, it
concluded that the plaintiffs had shown that the NCAA’s rules foreclosing the market
for their NILs in video games made by third parties resulted in an injury in fact.28
The O’Bannon effect was to essentially bookend the legal argument for the
NCAA’s prohibition on player compensation for their NIL. The case further solidified
the NCAA’s argument to retain amateur status for collegiate athletics, foreclosing legal
challenges to its restriction on indirect player compensation. From a legal standpoint,
the NCAA’s regulations against any and all player compensation held sound following
O’Bannon. Nevertheless, despite this judicial ruling, the NCAA’s policies regarding
player compensation soon met opposition from an aspect of society wherein final
judgments are much harder to come by.
II. THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FOR CHANGE AND THE NCAA’S RESPONSE
A.

THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION

Had the challenges to the NCAA’s restrictions on player compensation been
restricted to the judicial system, collegiate athletics were all but assured to remain in
the confines of amateurism. However, the court of public opinion has increasingly
come to reflect broad support for some compensation for college athletes. The shift in
opinion was also swift and dramatic, leaving the NCAA to fight the battle over player
compensation on a front that had previously been nonexistent.
A Gallup poll conducted in 2001 showed that three out of four Americans opposed
paying college athletes anything beyond the scholarships they were receiving.29 Public
26

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.
We cannot agree that a rule permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation
and a rule forbidding them from paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in
promoting amateurism and preserving consumer demand. Both we and the district court agree
that the NCAA's amateurism rule has procompetitive benefits. But in finding that paying
students cash compensation would promote amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the
district court ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.

27

See id. at 1067.
See id. At the time of O’Bannon, the NCAA had terminated its relationship with Electronic Arts
(“EA”), the video game maker granted the ability to use college athletes’ NIL by the NCAA. The NCAA
asserted that it had no intent to license its intellectual property for use in video games in the future. However,
the court placed no weight on that assertion, stating that it was not clearly erroneous for the lower court to
conclude that the NCAA may well begin working with EA or another video game company in the future.
29
Mark Gillespie, March Madness in Minneapolis Makes Many Hoops Fans Merry, GALLUP (Mar. 30,
2001), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1852/March-Madness-Minneapolis-Makes-Many-Hoops-FansMerry.aspx. The Gallup poll also showed that only twenty-one percent of Americans would favor paying
college athletes anything in addition to the scholarships they were receiving. Moreover, seventy-seven percent
of respondents stated that they would be opposed to any protests over the issue that would involve a boycott of
the NCAA basketball tournament, which was beginning at the time of the survey, to draw attention to the issue
of paying college athletes.
28
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perception changed little over the coming years,30 but fringe efforts to combat the
NCAA’s regulations began to crop up in the corners of a few state legislatures.31
However, public opinion began to shift as O’Bannon was being litigated. Polls by
Seton Hall and Marist College in late 2011 and early 2012 respectively, showed that
attitudes on the issue revealed a shrinking majority of Americans were still opposed to
player compensation.32
However, many of these polls asked respondents if college-athletes should receive
stipends beyond their school’s cost of attendance. O’Bannon assisted in drawing a
distinction between player stipends and players being able to capitalize on their NIL
through merchandise and advertising contracts. This distinction proved to be vital in
the eyes of the public. A 2014 Reason-Rupe poll showed that sixty-four percent of
Americans believed that student-athletes should receive money if a college or company
sells gear containing their likeness or jersey number.33 The 2017 Seton Hall survey
showed that while sixty percent of Americans still felt providing a scholarship was
sufficient for college-athletes, only forty-five percent of respondents felt that studentathletes should not share in TV revenue, or receive a salary for participating in the
NCAA March Madness tournament.34
30
A 2003 USA Today polling showed that seventy-two percent of Americans were still opposed to
paying college athletes beyond their school’s cost of attendance. While this number was down slightly from
the previous year’s result of seventy-two percent, the figure remained within the margin of error. See USA
TODAY, Poll: 72% say athletes should not be paid (Feb. 28, 2003, 3:05 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2003-02-28-notes_x.htm.
31
See id. In 2003, Nebraska state senator Ernie Chambers introduced his second legislative attempt for
University of Nebraska football players to be issued a stipend. The bill was meant to spark a national
conversation about paying college athletes, as it would only go into effect if three other states in the Big 12
Football Conference passed similar legislation. With public opinion still resoundingly adverse to Chambers’
efforts, the movement sputtered with little momentum beyond the borders of Nebraska. His efforts on the
issue may finally be coming to a head after all these years. Senator Chambers, at eighty-two years old and
now Nebraska’s longest-serving state senator, introduced Nebraska’s version of the Fair Pay to Play Act as
part of this year’s momentous push by state legislatures across the country for college athlete compensation.
See Van Jensen, For love or money, THE DAILY NEBRASKAN (FEB. 20, 2003),
http://www.dailynebraskan.com/for-love-or-money/article_e4338184-3fea-5b24-bea0-5d975ec9faea.html.
32
See Rob Gloster, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid for Playing Sports, Poll Says, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-22/college-athletes-shouldn-tget-salary-for-playing-seton-hall-survey-finds; see also MARIST POLL, 3/29: Majority Thinks Colleges Break
NCAA Rules . . . Most Say Only Scholarships for Athletes (Mar. 29, 2012), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/329majority-thinks-colleges-break-ncaa-rules%E2%80%A6most-say-only-scholarships-forathletes/#sthash.41eVjeQd.dpbs. The 2011 Seton Hall survey showed that two-thirds of people believed that
student-athletes should be paid a salary to participate in intercollegiate sports. The survey’s timing is
noteworthy, as it came on the heels of the NCAA beginning investigations into the University of Miami’s
possible payment to dozens of athletes and Ohio State football players selling memorabilia for their own
profit. Subsequent polling by Marist College continued to show that roughly two-thirds of people remained
opposed to the idea of compensating student athletes.
33
Alexis Garcia, Poll: Americans Say College Basketball Players Deserve Share of NCAA's TV Money
and Merchandise Sales, REASON-RUPE (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:50 AM), https://reason.com/2014/04/03/pollamericans-support-giving-college-ba/. The Reason-Rupe poll also showed that half of Americans believed
that college basketball players should share in NCAA’s $700 million television revenue from the annual
March Madness tournament. Id.
34
Marty Appel, Seton Hall Sports Poll on NCAA Tournament and Student-Athlete Pay (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.shu.edu/business/news/sports-poll-on-ncaa-basketball-players-and-tournament.cfm. The Seton
Hall poll also showed a generational divide on the issue, as individuals ages eighteen to forty-four were much
more likely to believe that students were being exploited than those over the age of forty-five. Id.
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Buttressed by O’Bannon, the distinction between a direct payment stipend being
provided to players and their ability to capitalize on the use of their NIL showed a
window of opportunity for advocates of change. Unlike a stipend, NIL rights would
not reallocate money away from other college students or cost taxpayer dollars.
Instead, NIL rights would open the door for merchandise and advertising sales of third
parties, who would be able to voluntarily capitalize on the privilege of using collegeathletes’ identities.
B.

THE MOVEMENT BY STATES

With this distinction drawn, it seemed only to be a matter of time before state
legislatures took action responding to this new public outlook. The movement
eventually found its inception in California, a progressive state with a staggering
twenty-five institutions participating in Division I Athletics alone and 24,000 collegeathletes across all three NCAA divisions.35 State Senators Nancy Skinner and Steve
Bradford introduced Senate Bill 206 (“SB-206”), the Fair Pay to Play Act, in February
2019, which proposed to prohibit any of the state’s universities from denying their
student-athletes the ability to profit from their NIL.36 The legislation moved through
committees with little resistance and passed by unanimous support through both
houses of the state legislature in September 2019.37 The bill was subsequently signed
into law by Governor Gavin Newsom at the end of that very month.38
The ultimate ambitions behind California’s Fair Pay to Play Act are much greater
than a desire to promptly change the compensation status of Californian studentathletes. In fact, the statute’s provisions do not become operative until 2023.39 Instead,
SB-206 was intended to kickstart a national movement toward demanding collegeathletes the right to capitalize on their NIL rights. This intention is evidenced by
Governor Newsom’s statements made while signing the bill:
Maverick Carter, Lebron James’s Business Manager: “When you put
pen to paper right now, what’s this going to change, and what’s this
going to do?”

35
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Division I Schools, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/divisioni-schools (last visited Mar. 3, 2020); see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA responds to
California Senate Bill 206, NCAA (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206.
36
CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 67456 (West 2019). See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, SB-206
Collegiate athletics: student athlete compensation and representation (2019),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB206; see also Michael
McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, but a Federal Law Is What They Should Fear, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 04, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-football/2019/10/04/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-namelikeness-image-laws. Sports Illustrated even gave SB-206 the moniker the “Ed O’Bannon law,” due to its
close inspiration based on the successful case brought forward by the former NBA player and UCLA
basketball star.
37
See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION.
38
See id.
39
CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 67456 (West 2019).

Journal of Legislation

311

Governor Newsom: “It’s going to initiate dozens of other states to
introduce similar legislation, and it’s going to change college sports
for the better by having now the interest, finally, of the athletes on
par with the interests of the institutions.”40
The predictions of Governor Newsom and those behind the Fair Pay to Play Act
were realized nearly instantaneously. Within a matter of days, lawmakers in other
states such as Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina had each begun the process of drafting and
introducing their own versions of SB-206 into their respective state legislatures.41 The
speed of the movement was staggering, rebuking any notion that this initiative was
destined to meet the same ends as similar, albeit isolated, efforts for student-athlete
compensation in previous decades.
While impressive in its ability to span across dozens of states, the movement to
enact legislative proposals quickly shifted from expanding across the country to
creating uniformity among the numerous state proposals. While each state signified a
complementary effort to advance the goal of NIL compensation for student-athletes,
the statutes being introduced in these disparate legislatures were not consistent,
therefore setting up the NCAA’s traditional legal argument that collegiate sports
require a national standard.
C. THE NCAA’S RESPONSE
The NCAA was not completely blindsided by the legislative efforts occurring at
the state levels. In May 2019, the NCAA had announced that a Federal and State
Legislation Working Group would examine issues highlighted in recently proposed
federal and state statutes related to student-athlete NIL rights.42 The working group
was charged with producing a set of Association-wide principles to provide each
division guidance for a consistent approach on legislation related to NIL payments.43
By creating a working group to address these legislative proposals, early supporters
believed the NCAA was looking to keep the ball in its court, so to speak, by dictating
how the organization considered modifications to their current policies.44 This concern
was prompted by the belief that, even at the time of its creation, the working group’s

40

The Shop: Uninterrupted, supra note 1.
See McCann, supra note 36.
See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA working group to examine name, image and likeness, NCAA
(May 14, 2019, 2:40 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-working-groupexamine-name-image-and-likeness.
43
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEDERAL AND STATE
LEGISLATION WORKING GROUP, available at
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/exec_boardgov/BOG_FederalStateLegWGFINAL.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
44
See Terry Collins, NCAA’s Ruling on College Athletes Getting Paid Is Still ‘Smoke and Mirrors,’
Experts Say, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Oct. 30, 2019, 7:35 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/30/ncaa-decisioncollege-athletes-pay/.
41
42
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directives seemed at odds with the desires of those initiating legislative proposals to
address the issue of NIL rights for student-athletes.45
The diverse effects of each state’s statute also played to the advantage of the
NCAA. As a national organization running an interstate operation, the NCAA requires
uniformity among states for a cohesive system of college athletics. As a legal
argument, this plea for comity among states is not novel by the NCAA. For example,
in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller, the NCAA was successful in
seeking injunctive relief to rule a Nevada statute as a per se unconstitutional violation
of the commerce clause because it required the NCAA to provide additional procedural
due process protections in enforcement proceedings against the state’s universities.46
Unquestionably, the NCAA’s legal challenges to subsequent state laws, such as
California’s Fair Pay to Play, would center around its historically successful argument
that collegiate athletics is a product of interstate commerce inherently requiring a
uniform national standard.
D. FEDERAL PROPOSALS
As an alternative to state-led initiatives, there have been signs of efforts to
introduce legislation at the federal level. Notably, Congressman Mark Walker (R-NC)
has introduced House Resolution 1804, known as the “Student-Athlete Equity Act.”47
The Act, which has bipartisan co-sponsorship, would amend the Internal Revenue
Code to remove a corporate exemption for student-athletes’ ability to profit off their
name, image, or likeness.48 In effect, this would force the NCAA to either pay
significantly more in taxes or allow student-athletes to earn NIL compensation.49
While more succinct than California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, Congressman Walker’s
bill illustrates the effectiveness of federal legislation. Unlike individual state statutes
45
See id. The NCAA’s press release announcing the working group, while a positive step toward
achieving the goal of NIL compensation for student-athletes, contained language that seemed to be an attempt
at mitigating its potential outcomes. For example, the press release noted that part of the working group’s
charge was to determine whether players’ NIL payments “would be achievable and enforceable” and “whether
this would be plausible in keeping with the Association’s mission.” This language mirrored much of the legal
arguments that the NCAA had brought forth over the decades in defending its amateur status. Id.
46
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).
Nevada is not the only state that has enacted or could enact legislation that establishes
procedural rules for NCAA enforcement proceedings. Florida, Illinois, and Nebraska have also
adopted due process statutes and similar legislation has been introduced in five other states.
Those statutes could easily subject the NCAA to conflicting requirements. For example,
suppose that state X required proof of an infraction beyond a reasonable doubt, while state Y
only required clear and convincing evidence, and state Z required infractions to be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Given that the NCAA must have uniform enforcement
procedures in order to accomplish its fundamental goals, its operation would be disrupted
because it could not possibly comply with all three statutes. Nor would it do to say that it need
only comply with the most stringent burden of persuasion (beyond a reasonable doubt), for a
state with a less stringent standard might well consider its standard a maximum as well as a
minimum. The serious risk of inconsistent obligations wrought by the extraterritorial effect of
the Statute demonstrates why it constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. Id.
47
H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).
48
See id.
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attempting to replicate California’s initiative, the Student-Athlete Equity Act amends
the federal tax code to force the NCAA’s hand on a national level.
A separate federal approach is being pursued by Congressman Anthony Gonzales
(R-OH), who was a wide-receiver at Ohio State and went on to play in the National
Football League.50 Congressman Gonzalez’s intention is to introduce a bill with
greater “guardrails” than its counterpart from Congressman Walker.51 Congressman
Gonzalez believes that a national approach is necessary for giving college athletes the
opportunity to make endorsement money.52 Further, he is unsatisfied with California’s
delayed implementation of the Fair Pay to Play Act, stating, “I actually think that we
need to do something quickly, within the next year. I don't think you have three years
to figure this out. I think decisions will start happening immediately.”53 Congressman
Gonzalez is also confident in his ability to achieve bipartisan support on his proposal.54
Lastly, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) has expressed his interest in pursuing NIL
compensation legislation.55 Senator Romney participated in a roundtable discussion
with other politicians and advocates of the player compensation movement.56 In an
interview with ESPN, Senator Romney said he was committed to finding a better way
to compensate college athletes and that he would spend time to gather perspectives on
how to best move forward.57 In as many words, he stated, “The reality is Congress is
going to act. We're coming for you [referring to the NCAA].”58
Irrespective of the nuances of each federal proposal, it is clear that there is an
appetite in Congress for a federal approach to student-athlete compensation. The
NCAA recognized this fact when establishing the Federal and State Legislation
Working Group.59 While state legislative efforts, such as the Fair Pay to Play Act, are
in more mature stages of their enactment process, industry commentators have argued
that a federal approach is the more appropriate vehicle to deliver NIL rights to college
athletes.60
E. CALIFORNIA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NCAA’S POLICIES
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Due to the various efforts at different legislative levels, it is likely that the NCAA’s
capitulation to these disparate movements for student-athlete compensation is not
monocausal. However, it would appear that California’s ratification of the Fair Pay to
Play Act was the straw that broke the camel’s back.61 Prior to the signing of the bill,
the NCAA sent a letter to Governor Newsom imploring him not to ratify the piece of
legislation.62 In the letter, which was also posted on their website, the NCAA Board
of Governors stated they believed the Fair Pay to Play Act was an unconstitutional
upending of the college sports model.63 Instead, they advocated for a national standard
to maintain the “essential element of fairness and equal treatment that forms the
bedrock of college sports.”64 In a USA TODAY interview, Ohio State President and
Chairman of the NCAA Board of Governors, Michael Drake, stated that SB-206 raised
constitutional challenges that could be legally challenged if it went into law.65
Nevertheless, Governor Newsom signed the bill with the knowledge that it could
serve as the catalyst for a national conversation.66 Although the enforcement of the
Fair Pay to Play Act was delayed until 2023, the NCAA is now in the position of either
legally challenging the law or facing an effective expiration date for its prohibition on
its restrictions against student-athlete NIL compensation. As previously stated, the
Fair Pay to Play’s intentions were realized nearly instantaneously across several state
legislatures. These disparate pieces of legislation magnified the difficulty of the
NCAA’s legal challenges to these statutes.
Just weeks after claiming that legislation such as the Fair Pay to Play Act was
unconstitutional, the NCAA’s Board of Governors voted unanimously to begin the
process of enhancing name, image, and likeness opportunities for student-athletes.67
In the press release announcing the decision, Chairman Drake stated,
Additional flexibility in this area can and must continue to support
college sports as a part of higher education. This modernization for
the future is a natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA
members have taken in recent years to improve support for student61
See Steve Almasy, Wayne Sterling, and Angela Barajas, NCAA says athletes may profit from name,
image and likeness, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/us/ncaa-athletescompensation/index.html. In an interview with CNN, Ohio State University athletic director and co-chair of
the NCAA’s working group stated, “[d]ifferent organizations and associations need interest groups or pressure
groups to move them in a certain direction, and the California law and other states that bring about laws is
probably a pressure point for us and caused us to move. So the bottom line is we're doing what's right and for
our student-athletes.”
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‘unconstitutional’, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:51 AM),
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athletes, including full cost of attendance and guaranteed
scholarships.68
The process directs the three NCAA divisions to update their bylaws and policies
regarding players’ opportunities to benefit from the use of their NILs by January
2021.69 The Board also listed several principles and guidelines to direct divisions in
their modernization process, including making clear the distinction between collegiate
and professional opportunities, reaffirming student-athletes are students and not
employees of the university, and making clear that compensation for athletics
performance or participation is impermissible.70 The NCAA’s release stated that the
board’s action was based upon the recommendations from the Federal and State
Legislation Working Group.71
By establishing this process, the NCAA arguably sought to retain control over NIL
compensation policies. Instead of litigating the multitude of state statutes being
brought forward or advocating for Congressional action to create a national standard
for these laws, the NCAA process puts the movement back on its own terms. In
directing their divisions to modernize their rules governing NIL rights for players, the
NCAA will be the sole overseer for how these bylaws and policies will be formulated
in the coming years.72
This is obviously troublesome for many advocates of the movement for collegeathlete NIL compensation. The very organization that has fought numerous legal
battles over decades to uphold the policy of amateurism in college sports and reject
player compensation could now be in the driver’s seat of the process to award collegeathletes these rights.
Following the NCAA’s announcement, those close to the movement for studentathlete NIL compensation expressed a guarded response. Andrew Zimbalist, professor
at Smith College and an expert on the economics of college sports, stated that the
NCAA’s action must be viewed as a reaction to the overwhelming force from outside
and an attempt to “puncture a hole in the balloon of legal and political pressure.”73
Lawmakers from across the country involved in the efforts to introduce legislation at
the state level also expressed their wariness in trusting the NCAA with autonomy over
the process.74
68
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Others were even less sanguine about the NCAA’s announcement. Although the
NCAA’s press release only established high-level principles and guidelines for the
process moving forward, some close to the effort to procure NIL compensation found
this guidance to be lacking compared to the state legislative packages being introduced
across the country. Ramogi Huma, the National College Players Association’s
executive director, stated that the NCAA was engaging in smoke and mirrors with the
process and laying the groundwork for limiting the benefit to non-cash and direct
compensation.75
The lack of details in the announcement, combined with the NCAA’s historical
stance toward compensation for its players, quickly led many advocates to continue
pushing for external pressures to ensure that the Association would adhere to the calls
for change. Huma urged state and federal lawmakers to continue with efforts to enact
legislative proposals, saying, “I don’t think this is going to happen voluntarily.”76
David Carter, executive director of the Marshall Sports Business Institute at the
University of Southern California, agreed that legal challenges to the NCAA’s
eventual policies were almost an assurance due to the numerous states that have
proposed NIL compensation legislation.77
Lawmakers at the heart of the issue readily offered their support to the idea of
utilizing state and federal legislation to impact the NCAA’s policy prescriptions
moving forward. California Senator Nancy Skinner, who co-authored the Fair Pay to
Play Act, stated, “[T]he devil will be in the details. Here in California, we are clear
that we won’t accept arbitrary limitations and look forward to the NCAA’s final action
being consistent with the right all other students have to generate income from their
talent and skills.”78
To advocates of NIL compensation rights, it seems that the legislative proposals
being introduced tipped the scales of the debate in their favor, convincing the NCAA
to begin the process of granting such rights to student-athletes.79 For this reason,
advocates also see legislation as having a continued role in shaping the policies that
are born from this process initiated by the NCAA.80 Mr. Huma stated that the NCAA,
through its initiation of this process, is “attempting to impose conditions it now has no

Iowa, Florida, California had not put pressure on the NCAA to do this, they would not have done any initial
steps to combat this issue, and so I think it was good that we have had this discussion brought up, and we're
going to continue to have this discussion on what the details should be on all of this.” See Brady McCollough,
News Analysis: NCAA makes move on name, image and likeness use, but there’s a long way to go, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019 11:34 AM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2019-10-29/ncaa-athletesnil-college-athletes-profit-name-image-likeness (California Governor Gavin Newsom stated, “California will
be closely watching as the NCAA’s process moves forward to ensure the rules ultimately adopted are aligned
with the legislation we passed this year.”).
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control over” due to the demands of enacted legislation such as the Fair Pay to Play
Act.81
Although the NCAA has initiated its own procedure to implement NIL rights for
student-athletes, advocates have raised legitimate concerns based upon the
Association’s precedent and its lack of oversight. For this reason, legislation still holds
a meaningful purpose in guiding the policies that will eventually regulate the NIL
compensation rights of college student-athletes. Particularly, a national standard for
NIL compensation rights for NCAA athletes is the most desirable outcome.
Accordingly, lawmakers should look to the legislative proposals already proposed in
dozens of states to make a uniform standard. This uniform standard could be
introduced at the congressional level, giving advocates the ability to shape the NIL
compensation process at the national lawmaking level.82 With the authority of federal
legislation, lawmakers would be able to effectively check the NCAA as it proceeds
through its own process, which could otherwise run the risk of lacking such
accountability.83
III. A MODEL FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
A.

THE FAIR PAY TO PLAY STATUTE

Though many states have proposed related statutes, California remains the only
jurisdiction to pass legislation on the matter of NIL compensation for studentathletes.84 The state’s Fair Pay to Play Act has served as a model for a growing number
of legislators around the country looking to introduce their own versions into state law.
For this reason, it is important to look toward SB-206’s statutory language, examining
the policies that will guide the state’s policy toward NIL rights for student-athletes if
the law were to go into effect in 2023.
Foremost, SB-206 proscribes, “[a] postsecondary educational institution shall not
uphold any rule, requirement, standard, or other limitation that prevents a student of
that institution participating in intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as
a result of the use of the student’s name, image, or likeness.”85 The clause creates a
blanket prohibition on any postsecondary educational institution attempting to prevent
its student-athletes from compensating from their NIL. This includes a prohibition
from such compensation affecting the student’s scholarship eligibility.86
Moreover, this prohibition extends to any “athletic association, conference, or
other group or organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics” attempting to
prevent a student-athlete or school from participating in intercollegiate athletics.87
These provisions are specifically aimed at the NCAA, which is explicitly mentioned
81
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in the text of the statute.88 The legislation also prohibits scholarships earned by
student-athletes from being treated as NIL compensation.89
Importantly, SB-206 also lays forth the guidelines for agent representation for
student-athletes looking to become compensated for their NIL.90 These agents are to
comply with federal sports agency laws with respect to their relationships with studentathletes, which are the same laws that guide professional sports agency relationships.91
However, a student-athlete’s “professional representation” is guided by that of state
law and licensure.92
The Fair Pay to Play Act also establishes processes for student-athletes entering
contracts for NIL compensation.93 A student-athlete may not enter into contracts
conflicting with the contractual agreements of their college team.94 All contracts
compensating athletes for their identity shall also be disclosed to an official designated
by the postsecondary institution.95 Lastly, SB-206 prohibits NIL compensation from
being procured by prospective student-athletes during the recruiting process.96 The
Fair Pay to Play Act’s broad language allows student-athletes to receive NIL
compensation with little constraint. Save for compliance with existing sports agent
laws, school policies, and reporting requirements, SB-206 largely creates a sweeping
allowance for student-athletes to be compensated for their NIL.97
Upon the NCAA’s announcement that it would start the process for NIL
opportunities to be granted to its student-athletes, the press release’s language seemed
to be an attempt to retreat from such permissions. In contrast to the Fair Pay to Play
Act, the NCAA’s press release articulated principles and guidelines for the process
that would appear to open the door for divisions to establish rules that would
conditionalize college-athletes’ ability to be compensated for their identity. 98 For
example, the guidelines included:
1. “Assure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete
students unless a compelling reason exist to differentiate.”
2. “Make clear the distinction between collegiate and professional
opportunities.”
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3. “Protect the recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to
select, remain at, or transfer to a specific institution.”99
These statements raised concerns from NIL advocates and led to calls to continue
legislative procedures to compel the NCAA from creating restrictive measures on NIL
rights for student-athletes.100
B.

STATUTES IN OTHER STATES

In an attempt to impede such imposed restrictions, California’s Fair Pay to
Play Act has served as a framework for other states looking to create a sweeping right
for college-athletes to obtain NIL compensation. Illinois State Representative
Emanuel Chris Welch and Florida State Representative Kionne McGhee have
introduced statutes in their respective legislatures that virtually mirrors the language
of SB-206.101 However, the consistency among proposals essentially disappears aside
from those replicating the statutory language of the Fair Pay to Play Act for their state.
Left to their own design, state legislators have proposed an assortment of statutes
that directly conflict with one another. For example, legislation introduced in
Washington would not limit payment for compensation to student-athletes’ NIL rights,
but would instead only limit compensation to an amount “commensurate with the
market value of the services provided. . . .”102 Other instances of inconsistencies
include: a bill introduced in Colorado that would allow student-athletes to be paid
directly for competing; a proposed law in New York that would require college athletic
departments to give a fifteen percent share of annual revenue to student-athletes; a
South Carolina proposal that would require the state’s largest colleges to pay a $5,000
annual stipend to athletes of its profitable sports; and a law introduced in Maryland
that would grant student-athletes the right to unionize and participate in collective
bargaining.103
While California’s SB-206 was groundbreaking at the time of its enactment, these
various state legislative proposals include provisions that would far exceed those
granted in the Fair Pay to Play Act. These discrepancies are important because they
signify the potential lack of uniformity that would attempt to govern a national
organization if various state legislatures were to pass such disparate provisions. As
previously stated, this lack of uniformity could actually play to the advantage of the
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NCAA, whose legal arguments for interstate comity has succeeded in cases such as
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller.104
The importance of a national standard becomes even more apparent when
recognizing that the enactment of these various statutes would virtually destroy the
playing field of the NCAA. Without a uniform standard, states would be incentivized
to engage in a race to the bottom, fighting to create the most accommodating laws for
prospective student-athletes to become attracted to their state’s higher education
institutions.105 Alternatively, a national standard would allow the NCAA to continue
with a level playing field across the country and between states. Not only would this
simplify and balance the competitive environment of collegiate athletics, it would also
eliminate the NCAA’s most promising legal challenges to state statutes attempting to
grant further rights to its student-athletes.106
As described above, many states’ policy proposals necessitate that college
athletics departments engage in revenue-sharing with its participants.107 However, this
scheme would have untoward effects on the collegiate athletics landscape because it
encumbers upon these departments an expense that was not previously in their static
budget. For this reason, it is reasonably foreseeable that many sports programs around
the country would be eliminated to necessitate the added expense of providing direct
compensation to student-athletes.
Moreover, the athletes most likely to receive limited NIL compensation
opportunities would also likely be the most affected by any such budget constraints—
as athletic departments would be incentivized to eliminate programs with the least
generated revenue. Instead, the players in higher revenue programs, who by their
nature will have greater exposure to NIL compensation opportunities, will receive
these direct compensation payments required by law as an added bonus to their NIL
endorsement opportunities. This complication could also raise the potential for Title
IX issues, as athletic departments would have to shift scholarship considerations and
participation opportunities for men and women following the elimination of sports
program.108 For these reasons, it would be unwise to include direct compensation
provisions as part of a federal legislative proposal to guide student-athlete
compensation rights.
C.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Much like the prospect of direct compensation payments, a legislative proposal to
allow the state’s student-athletes to unionize and engage in collective bargaining may
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prove to be too strenuous of an extension beyond California’s Fair Pay to Play Act.109
The right for players to unionize is wholly separate from granting NIL compensation.
Therefore, even if proponents looking to advance student-athletes’ rights wish to
achieve unionization, it would be unwise to demand that such a right be attached to
NIL compensation rights. If it were included in a federal legislative proposal for NIL
rights, collective bargaining rights may be seen as a dealbreaker for members of
Congress.
Furthermore, the issue of collective bargaining for student-athletes has been
litigated as a separate issue. Most recently, the issue of unionization for collegiate
athletes was undertaken in College Athletes Players Association v. Northwestern,
where Northwestern University football players sought the right to unionize as a
team.110 The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) voted unanimously to deny
the football team’s players the right to unionize, citing its concern about whether it
could even assert jurisdiction for an alternative ruling, which would foreseeably upset
the NCAA’s competitive balance and have detrimental effects on its existing rules.111
Due to the NLRB’s hesitation to entertain the unionization of a single team’s
players, the Board did not address the broader question of whether NCAA studentathletes have the ability to form a union altogether.112 Additionally, the NLRB declined
to decide upon whether the football team’s scholarship student-athletes are employees
under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).113 Further, the
NLRB asserted that even if it had determined that scholarship student-athletes were
statutory employees under the NLRA, “it would not effectuate the policies of the Act
to assert jurisdiction.”114
Northwestern is the most recent illustration of the unique legal and prudential
challenges faced by NCAA players’ efforts for collective bargaining and
unionization.115 These challenges are wholly separate from the progression toward
NIL compensation benefits. For these reasons, it would also be unwise for a federal
legislative proposal to include statutory language granting collective bargaining rights
to student-athletes of higher education institutions.
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While California’s Fair Pay to Play Act was extraordinary at the time of its
enactment, the Act’s passage influenced state legislators across the country to expound
upon its rights granted to student-athletes. A flurry of legislative proposals as diverse
as their jurisdictions have appeared in the few short months since SB-206 was
signed.116 The proposals have called for terms and rights far beyond those granted by
the Fair Pay to Play Act, whose passage alone was monumental in granting NIL
compensation rights to student-athletes.117
Nevertheless, the diverse statutory grants of direct compensation benefits,
collective bargaining, and revenue sharing each introduce untold challenges for the
actualization of greater rights to student-athletes. The legislative proposals and their
effects are untested and have ramifications for higher education institutions, athletic
conferences, and the NCAA. For these reasons, a federal legislative proposal for NIL
compensation rights for student-athletes should not include these additional proposals.
Attempting to piggyback such rights onto a proposal for NIL compensation benefits
jeopardizes efforts to actualize any enhanced rights altogether.
Consequently, a federal legislative proposal should mirror that of California’s Fair
Pay to Play Act. The Act gives a sweeping allowance to collegiate athletes’ ability to
be compensated for their NIL compensation rights, but its authority is arguably the
most conservative approach to laws that have been introduced to grant student-athletes
such an allowance.118 Aside from granting states’ licensure authority for sports agents
representing student-athletes, SB-206’s statutory language can be virtually copied
word-for-word into a federal proposal.119 Moreover, unlike other proposals put
forward in various states, the simple granting of NIL rights to student-athletes has
demonstrable support among the general public.120
It is important to note that such a federal proposal to grant NIL rights may not
even require passage. The mere proposal of such a law would initiate congressional
hearings and increased public awareness that would spotlight the NCAA’s ongoing
modifications of its NIL compensation policies. Legislation introduced at the federal
level would therefore be able to serve the purpose of providing accountability to the
NCAA’s process of exploring NIL opportunities for collegiate athletes. While the Fair
Pay to Play Act’s passage could be seen as being the catalyst for the NCAA’s
concession to exploring such rights, its oversight ability pales in comparison to a
hypothetical federal legislative proposal, even prior to the passage of any such
congressional act.
There has also been demonstrable congressional support for granting studentathletes NIL compensation rights. Representatives Mark Walker and Anthony
Gonzalez have separately proposed legislation to grant collegiate athletes the right to
collect revenue based upon their identity.121 Additionally, senatorial interest on the
issue has been evidenced by Senator Romney, who signaled his readiness to address
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the issue with congressional action.122 Collectively, the prospect of congressional
support for granting NIL compensation rights for student-athletes appears to be quite
promising.
If congressional action were to be taken, it would be advantageous to introduce
such legislation as soon as possible. The NCAA’s directive for its divisions to update
their bylaws and policies regarding the opportunity for players to benefit from their
NIL by January 2021 places a definitive timeline upon the creation of these policies.123
With the NCAA currently left unchecked, its three divisions are amending their bylaws
independent of external advocacy, legislative mandate, or effective oversight. Not
only would an immediate legislative proposal allow for proper vetting before the
NCAA’s deadline, it would also give the Association’s divisions adequate time to
adjust to any such proposed statutory language.
CONCLUSION
The signing of California Senate Bill 206 was a turning point in the fight for
student-athlete compensation. Since its inception at the beginning of the twentieth
century, the NCAA has fiercely guarded the amateur status of collegiate sports.
However, a growing public majority has called for student-athletes to have the ability
to generate revenue for their name, image, and likeness.124 Even in the event that NIL
compensation rights are granted to student-athletes, the amateur classification of
collegiate sports retains its non-employee status, bolstered by precedent such as Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and its progeny.125
The NCAA’s announcement of exploring NIL opportunities inherently contains
the concession that the amateur status of collegiate athletics can be retained while
granting its participants NIL compensation rights.126 O’Bannon provided a window of
opportunity for advocates of player compensation, acknowledging a distinction
between direct compensation and NIL compensation.127 Long before O’Bannon’s
decision in 2015, pollsters had already seen momentum in the public opinion’s
willingness to accept some sort of compensation for student-athletes.
NIL compensation opportunities quickly became the most likely avenue for
student-athlete compensation to become a reality. As opposed to salaries, revenuesharing, or direct stipends, NIL contracts could allow third-party organizations to
voluntarily enter into contracts for the use of a player’s identity. Free from the
considerations of taxpayer dollars and athletic department budgets, NIL compensation
for student-athletes has found majority support in the court of public opinion.128
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Through the Fair Pay to Play Act, the California state legislature took the
exceptional step of passing legislation to reflect the public’s antagonism toward NCAA
policies regarding NIL rights for student-athletes. California’s capacity to effect
change, represented by its outsized twelve percent proportion of the entire population
of the United States, motivated legislators around the country to follow suit and
introduce their own bills to grant student-athletes with similar NIL rights.129
For its part, the NCAA appeared to be accepting the writing on the wall,
announcing a working group to examine the legislation that was sweeping the country
prior to SB-206’s enactment. However, Governor Newsom’s signing of the law in the
fall of 2019 created a new reality for the NCAA, establishing a timetable where player
compensation would be treated differently by statutory mandate. However, a single
state’s attempt to effectuate its own policy around collegiate athletics is not novel, and
precedent such as Miller has shown that the NCAA’s plea for comity among states and
a national uniform standard is readily heard by courts.130 The NCAA has long utilized
theories of interstate commerce to strike down individual state’s attempts to alter
treatment of student-athletes. However, this argument loses its luster when presented
against a federal mandate. Removed from the prospect of disparate impacts upon a
national organization, congressional action would create the uniformity that has been
at the heart of the NCAA’s legal argument for decades.
Placed in a position where the prospect of federal legislation seems likely, the
NCAA has begun its own process to explore the prospect of instituting bylaws to allow
for players’ NIL compensation. Instead of relying upon its longtime tactics of
litigating student-athlete compensation, the NCAA is attempting to circumvent a
potential congressional approach to the matter by seeking to recover authority to shape
its NIL compensation policy. However, the organization’s history in matters regarding
player compensation has caused many of the movement’s advocates to call for
legislative mandates to proceed at all levels.
The disparate state legislative proposals, albeit impressive in their geographic
scope, retain the NCAA’s ability to argue for a uniform standard. Therefore, a federal
legislative proposal should be brought forward to provide for effective oversight as the
NCAA proceeds with its own development of NIL policies. State proposals, although
inspired by the Fair Pay to Play Act, have had dissimilar statutory language attempting
to create further rights unconsidered by SB-206. Disconnected from NIL
compensation, these proposed rights granted beyond those of SB-206 present their own
discrete legal and prudential challenges. For this reason, such statutory language
should be decidedly separate from a federal legislative proposal for NIL compensation
rights.
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act has provided a basic framework for granting NIL
rights, allowing for such compensation without many constraints. Effectively, its
statutory terms are constructed to allow Congress to copy its language into a federal
proposal. The mere introduction of such a proposal would signal to the NCAA that it
is not without supervision in its drafting of NIL compensation policies.
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Irrespective of whether Congress passes a law mandating NIL compensation rights
for student-athletes, merely proposing such an enactment still has a place in the effort
to grant student-athletes such opportunities. Time is of the essence for any such
proposal, as the NCAA’s divisions are now within a year’s time of required institution
of NIL policies. Congressional action could prove to be the deciding factor in the
longstanding advocacy for collegiate athletics properly introducing NIL compensation
opportunities for its participants. Unquestionably, federal legislation still has a role to
play in the fight for student-athlete compensation.

